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Secure Quantum Telephones
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We propose in this paper a novel deterministic protocol using particular maximally entangled
states of polarized photons for a genuine bidirectional secure communication setup. We further pro-
pose a plausible experimental setup for such a protocol using currently available optical technology
which liberates two communicating party from sharing identical apparatus. We note that security
of the protocol is promised by the monogamous nature of maximally entangled states. We discuss
the security of our protocol in the light of some simple eavesdropping scenarios.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.Hk
Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is ar-
guably the only currently feasible realization of the appli-
cation of quantum mechanics to the field of information
theory and cryptography. Promising security based on
the postulates of quantum mechanics, it allows one to
abandon the notion of security in computational com-
plexity, e.g. the RSA [1] and by making no presuppo-
sitions regarding an adversary Eve save that she func-
tions only in the possibilities of the quantum world. A
host of QKD protocols emerged starting from the pio-
neering work of BB84 [2], entanglement based protocols
like Ekert 91 [3] and variants of the two including [4, 5] to
name only a few. Deterministic setups then came to be
proposed in principle for the possibility of secure direct
communication (we note that thus far, this would only
be true in the context of a noiseless channel). Amongst
them were reported in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Other protocols like
Chen et al. [11] includes deterministic only in the context
of no wastage of qubits due to wrong measurement bases
or even in the test for an eavesdropper. However, most
of these protocols mentioned (excepting [9]) do not allow
for a bidirectional form of communication without neces-
sitating double setups; or simply put, for any such setup
allowing Alice to encode bits for Bob, another duplicate
to allow for Bob to encode bits for Alice is necessary. We
propose in this paper a novel protocol making use of two
nonsinglet maximally entangled states to allow for such
a bidirectional communication to be achieved securely;
namely ‘secure quantum telephone’. We adopt the defi-
nition of deterministic (as proposed in [10]), when the en-
coding/decoding procedure in principle allows a recipient
to infer with certainty what was encoded by the trans-
mitter. We note a protocol for quantum dialogue was re-
ported in [9]. However, the protocol carries a flaw where
a Quantum Man in the Middle (QMM) attack would go
totally undetected. Another work [12] rescues the flaw
and was presented using the GHZ states. However in
contrast, our proposal is certainly more feasible as we
do not resort to Bell measurements nor GHZ state mea-
surements. We further propose a possible experimental
setup which may be used to realise the protocol with
currently available technology. We briefly also discuss a
possible modification to our protocol to improve its ef-
ficiency. The security of our protocol is demonstrated
by considering an Eve attacking using a simple Intercept
Resend (IR) strategy with von Neumann measurements
as well as the QMM attacks.
The protocol. We make use of two Bell states that can
be generated through the process of spontaneous para-
metric down conversion in nonlinear crystal,
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|V 〉+ |V 〉|H〉) ,
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|H〉 − |V 〉|V 〉) . (1)
The state |H〉 (|V 〉) denotes horizontal (vertical) polar-
ization state of photon. We describe the protocol as fol-
lows: Bob selects between the two possible Bell pairs,
|ψ+〉 and |φ−〉, and sends half of the pair to Alice who
will measure in either the basis σx = |H〉〈V |+ |V 〉〈H | or
σz = |H〉〈H | − |V 〉〈V |. After announcing her measure-
ment (not results), Bob sends to Alice the other half and
Alice again measures in the same basis as before. Hence,
we can find the characteristic equations as:
σx ⊗ σx|ψ+〉 = |ψ+〉,
σz ⊗ σz|ψ+〉 = −|ψ+〉,
σx ⊗ σx|φ−〉 = −|φ−〉,
σz ⊗ σz |φ−〉 = |φ−〉. (2)
Alice then informs over an authenticated public channel
whether the results were correlated or otherwise. Given
equation (2), Bob would be able to know which basis
Alice had chosen and they may then share a secret bit.
Alice on the other hand, given her bases of choice, may
know for certain the pair that Bob had sent. In this
way, for every encoding done by Alice (choice of basis),
Bob may decode it without ambiguity and likewise for
every bit of Bob’s encoding (choice of state), Alice would
decode perfectly. We however note though that a more
reasonable setup would have Alice and Bob encoding in
separate runs (which is more sensible in a communica-
tion setup), i.e Alice or Bob’s encoding run separately.
To ensure security, Alice (Bob) would select (predeter-
mined selection) qubit pairs to be tested for a CHSH [13]
2violation by making measurements in relevant bases to
yield maximal violation. We note that this is reminis-
cent of the control modes in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The test for
a maximal CHSH violation would tell the communicat-
ing parties of the purity of their Bell states. It is well
known that an entangled Bell pair exhibits a characteris-
tic known as monogamy [14, 15] where they do not allow
another party to correlate with.
The control mode may be carried out as follows: Alice
selects at random, with probability C which of the pairs
that she would use for a CHSH check and after her mea-
surement on the first qubit, she informs Bob of the fact
that it is a control mode. Bob then would proceed with
his own measurements and such a process is sufficiently
repeated with certain probability so that the CHSH value
may be estimated. We note that Eve would only know of
the control mode after Alice’s measurement. We denote
Alice’s and Bob’s bases measurement for the purpose of
CHSH testing by a11, a
2
1, a
1
2, and a
2
2. The CHSH param-
eter S, is given by
S = E(a11, a
1
2)− E(a11, a22) + E(a21, a12) + E(a21, a22) (3)
and is equal to 2
√
2 (or −2√2) for maximally entangled
pure states. Hence, a maximal violation tells Alice that
the channel is secure. We note that in fact in the in-
stances of Bob’s encoding run, a control mode may be
requested by Bob after Alice’s first measurement. The
control modes are done where the encoding party has
the freedom to choose which run would be for control
mode and which for message. This is in contrast to [9]
where control mode is Alice’s prerogative alone.
Experimental Setup. As depicted in Figure 1, we pro-
pose a feasible free-space setup to implement our key
distribution protocol. A laser pulse pumped into a bar-
ium borate (BBO) crystal will generate one of the four
Bell states depending on the cutting angle of the crystal.
Bob then prepares his Bell states, either |ψ+〉 or |φ−〉 by
controlling an electro-optical liquid crystal polarization
(LCP) rotator, R1. After traversing through a fiber path
a-c, one photon (half of the Bell pair) will be sent to Al-
ice’s lab while the other will be sent to the looped fiber
L1 on the arm b-c. We require here polarization main-
tained (PM) fibers to implement the paths a-c and b-c.
The length of loop L1 should be greater than the line-
of-sight distance between Bob’s lab and Alice’s lab since
the second photon can only be sent out from Bob’s lab
after a measurement has been done by Alice onto the first
photon. Alice’s lab is equipped with a LCP rotator R2,
a polarized beam splitter PBS, and two avalanche photo
diode detectors. Alice will choose the measurement ba-
sis by controlling the rotator R2. It is also important to
consider the losses of the fiber since we need to delay the
traveling time of photon 2 in fiber loop L1.
Eavesdropping and efficiency. In the simplest scenario
where an adversary Eve attempts an Intercept Resend
(IR) strategy, she needs to measure Bob’s qubits before
Bob Alice
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R2 PBS
D1
D2
L1
a
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b
FIG. 1: A proposed implementation of the protocol.
sending them to Alice thereafter. Such an attack would
result in her sending a separable state to Alice and a
CHSH test would give |S| ≤ 2. Another method of at-
tack conceivable by Eve would be the QMM where she
would exchange the pairs she receives with her own Bell
pair. Simply enough, she receives and distributes the rel-
evant pairs in a sequential manner just as Bob would. In
this way, Eve would know perfectly the information en-
coded by Alice and upon performing a Bell measurement
to distinguish between the pure Bell states Bob sent, she
would know what encoding Bob would deduce from Al-
ice’s announcement. However, in a control mode, Eve
would have Alice measure her half of the Bell pair and
her only way of avoiding detection is to somehow influ-
ence Bob’s result so that Alice and Bob would have a
maximal CHSH violation. To commit to a measurement
herself on the qubit received from Bob would, uninter-
estingly translates into Alice and Bob again measuring
noncorrelated separable states, resulting with |S| ≤ 2.
Having access to Alice’s other half (disentangled state),
say |E〉 as well as her half of Bob’s entangled qubit her
hope would be for Bob to make his measurements on the
|E〉 (this implicitly suggests Eve’s hope that she uses the
same entangled state that Bob does). She therefore looks
for a process T as such
T (|Φ〉〈Φ|, |E〉)→ |E〉, |χ〉〈χ| (4)
The |Φ〉〈Φ| is the density operator of the entangled qubit
at Bob’s station and |χ〉〈χ| is the state that Eve has
after the process T . The first term on the right hand
side of equation(4) would be the state of the qubit now
belonging to Bob and the second to Eve. We believe
Eve may best achieve this by virtue of a teleportation
scheme. However, differently from the conventional tele-
portation scheme, Bob would not be making any unitary
transformation on his qubit and therefore only in half the
instances would he actually make a measurement on |E〉.
The other half the time, Bob would be making a mea-
surement on a state orthogonal to |E〉. We may imagine
then Alice and Bob testing CHSH on the a state that is
3a mixture of the entangled states expected.
ρ =
1
2
|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ 1
2
|φ−〉〈φ−| (5)
and S(ρ) = 0.
Alternatively, Alice and Bob may check for errors, d
instead of the CHSH and for the IR and QMM attack,
the probability of detection gives d = 25% and d = 50%
respectively. Eve’s probability of stealing say, I = nIAE
bit of information without being detected is P (C, d) =
(1−C)n/[1−C(1− d)]n [6] where IAE is the amount of
mutual information shared between Alice and Eve given
an attack scheme. It is straightforward to see for c > 0,
the protocol is asymptotically secure.
The theoretical efficiency of a QKD protocol as given
by Cabello [16] is expressed as E = bs/(qt + bt), where
bs is the expected number of secret bits received, qt the
number of transmitted qubits on the quantum channel,
and bt the number of transmitted bits on the classical
channel. It is straightforward to calculate our protocol
as having an efficiency of E = [2/(2+2)] = 1/2. However,
as mentioned above, it is more reasonable to assume that
Alice and Bob would encode/ decode in separate runs.
Hence, an average efficiency for the protocol is Emin =
[1/(2+ 1)+ 1/(2 + 2)]/2 = 7/24 (Alice’s encoding differs
from Bob’s). This would admittedly be comparable to
that of BB84. We further note that we do not consider
control modes in our calculations in the spirit of [16],
where the probability c may be taken to be small and
therefore the bits sacrificed are negligible.
Modification and increased efficiency. We now deliber-
ate on a possible modification of our protocol to increase
the efficiency and essentially improves the work in [9]. In
a certain sense, it is essentially very much similar to the
protocol reported in [17] with an additional step allowing
for either of the parties to encode/decode information.
We consider Bob sending any of the four Bell states in
a sequential manner as before and the encodings would
be in the Bell states, i.e, |ψ+〉 ≡ 00,|ψ−〉 ≡ 01,|φ+〉 ≡ 10
and |φ−〉 ≡ 11. We note that in [17], encoding is re-
flected in the unitary operations producing these Bell
states starting from the singlet state |ψ−〉. Alice upon
receiving Bob’s qubit would acknowledge receipt over the
public channel. Bob then sends the second qubit and Al-
ice makes Bell measurements to distinguish which of the
Bell states Bob sent. Alice then considers a unitary trans-
formation (either of the three Pauli matrices, σ1, σ2, σ3
or the identity operation, σ0 = I) which would transform
the state that Bob sent;
σi ⊗ I |Ψ〉 → |Ψ′〉 i = 0, 1, 2, 3, |Ψ〉 , |Ψ′〉 ∈ {ψ±, φ±} .(6)
In order to encode and send the desired bits to Bob as
|Ψ′〉, Alice may just inform Bob over the public channel
of the relevant operation considered. Bob would deduce
with certainty Alice’s encoding as the resulting state of
the operation on the state he sent. A control mode would
proceed with Alice making projective measurements of
the first qubit and informs Bob of the basis used and
result to check for errors. We further note that the ef-
ficiency of the modified protocol Em is essentially Em =
4/(2+3) = 4/5 (average=[2/(2+3)+2/(2+1)]/2 = 8/15)
where the three classical bits come from Alice’s receipt
and operation disclosed. However, all in all, given the ex-
perimental demands of this modification which includes
Bell measurements as well as more quantum memory ca-
pacity (fiber loop on both Alice and Bob’s side), we pre-
fer to think our first protocol as a more proper practical
solution for a secure quantum telephone.
Conclusion. We have presented in this paper a novel
and simple protocol for two way secure quantum commu-
nication. In line with simplicity of a protocol and ease of
possible implementation, our work does not require Bell
measurements, rather only sharp von Neumann measure-
ments and security is promised by the monogamous na-
ture of maximally entangled pairs. This is checked by
testing the CHSH violation to ensure purity of the states
sent. The theoretical efficiency of our protocol is compa-
rable to BB84. While granting security in the face of an
IR attack, we note that our protocol does not share the
flaw against QMM attack in [9]. Our proposed optical
setup is very much feasible given current technology. We
note that in reality, the protocol works as a ‘telephone’ so
to speak only in the case of noiseless channels and in the
case otherwise, the protocol may be used (supplemented
by error correction schemes and privacy amplification)
for a normal QKD setup.
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